


Development Workshop

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BAIRRO UPGRADING
IN
LUANDA'S MUSSEQUES

by
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DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP
Luanda Angola
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BACKGROUND:

Angola in 1987, along with Mocambique, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, remains one of the five of the original 20 nations, targeted in the U.N.'s "Emergency Plan for Africa". The long term urban crisis in Angola's capital Luanda has been exacerbated during the "Emergency" by the influx of "Deslocados" or internal refugees from areas destabilized by South African backed insurgents. Ongoing cycles of political disruption and localized rural drought dating back to the independence war against Portuguese colonialism remain unbroken today and fuel this rural to urban migration. An extremely high population growth rate of 8% has resulted in Luanda in the years since independence. In-migration to the city accounts for the largest part (more than 5%) of this extremely high rate, while less than 3% can be attributed to the natural population increase.

URBAN ENVIRONMENT:


Luanda's urban environment is formally considered to have two sectors; the "Urbanizado" or the colonial city planned and serviced with streets, properly aligned; and the "Periurban Musseques" which are basically unplanned settlements with few if any urban services. In fact today the city can not be so neatly divided.

Within the planned or "Urbanized" zone falls the "Bairro Populares"; projects copied from the 'Township Models' prevalent in most other Southern African countries. These planned bairros are comparatively few in number in Luanda, and represent the colonial government's belated attempt during the last years before independence to provide urban services to a limited number of the African population. Due to poor maintenance of municipal services some of these zones have, but for their linear planning, come to resemble the Musseques once more.

The late sixties saw a speculative building boom in Luanda with both prices and new office buildings rising in parallel. At independence the Luanda skyline was littered with the skeletons of half finished high rise towers. They are still there today, but many of them are now inhabited by the new rural migrants who flocked to the city in the days after independence. Many of these structures had never had their service systems of water and sewage installed, and many more have long since ceased to function since falling water pressures, which are inevitable when the the limited colonial system is pressed into the service of the 'majority' for which it was not intended, mean that upper

Floors in high buildings go without. Some of these unfinished high blocks have been transformed into what could be called the "Vertical Musseques".

The Musseques themselves can be broadly divided into two categories: the older extremely high density conglomerations within the heart of the city and the more recent settlements on the urban periphery.



'MUSSEQUE' AND THE URBAN POLITIC:

The focus of this paper is the Musseque of Sambizanga within the Municipality of the same name in the city of Luanda. Sambizanga's musseque dates back to the late 19th century when agriculturalists from the Kikongo region of northern Angola settled north of the old port town of Luanda, which had itself been founded nearby an even older fishing village in the 16th century by Portuguese traders.

Large market gardening plots were staked out by the first settlers in the unirrigated upland areas, "lavras", and smaller irrigated ones along the river. A land tax imposed some years later by the colonial government on the local farmers forced them to begin subdividing their land into increasingly smaller plots in order to lease it out to raise the money necessary to meet the state's demands. The area began its transformation into a residential community, its characteristic musseque settlement pattern being rooted in this subdivision process.

Tennants gained only informal residential rights by paying an annual rent, or "forro", to the land owner, but had no legal rights in the eyes of the colonial state. The state therefore felt no responsibility to provide services, even though they were indirectly benefiting through the informal 'forro' system. As population pressures increased, plot sizes became smaller and profits higher for the property owners.

Luanda's distinctive urban structure evolved principally due to the lack of an effective colonial planning policy. Spontaneous bairros, "musseques", were successively encapsulated or surrounded by colonial 'formal sector' urban growth. Old high density Musseque bairros are to be found in pockets even in the heart of the modern city. These Musseque islands were hemmed in by modern sector developments or major roads but received little infrastructural investment. The Musseques still grew in population, reaching saturation densities of up to 1000 people per hectare, living in single story hutments.

The post II World War era brought a new colonial settlement policy. Portuguese immigrants, largely of a peasant background, from some of Portugal's most underdeveloped regions, were encouraged to settle in Angola. Although offered many incentives to farm, including land and equipment, many saw this as an opportunity to move to the city, and never left Luanda for the countryside. The proportion of whites in the city increased to more than 25% of the urban total.

In little more than ten years the white population in Angola had grown from a 1950 level of 78,800 to almost 200,000. This influx had dire affects on the African economy.

By the early 1960's the Portuguese migrants had penetrated most sectors of the work force, pushing Africans out into menial jobs. The once thriving local marketing and trading sector became the monopoly of the new white settlers. In the Musseques, Portuguese settler entrepreneurs set up shop offering goods at high prices but with easy credit terms. The "Taberna" system soon indebted most of the local Musseque population and created a dependency which would only eventually be broken by the flight of the Portuguese at independence.

From the mid 50's resistance to the colonial system began to develop in the Musseque bairros. Sambizanga Musseque became the natural home for the early groups which grew later into a national political structure. Many of the country's leadership came from this and other similar Musseque communities.

Physically, the dense maze of musseque narrow passageway and cul-de-sacs reflected the defensive psychology of the inhabitants during this period of resistance.



Just as the settlement pattern prohibited the rapid deployment of colonial police it facilitated the formation of local networks which were soon transformed into clandestine political cells.

Naturally the Portuguese comerciantes who had penetrated and subsequently usurped the Musseque economy were viewed with growing suspicion. They came to be feared for their association with the colonial secret police "P.I.D.E." who found the local shop keepers a valuable source of information on their indebted clientele.

With unexpected political changes in Portugal in the mid 70's and suddenly prospects of independence looming for Angola, the Portuguese settler community began to leave. Fear of a backlash, which never came, produced a panic. Homes and businesses were abandoned, everything movable was taken back to Portugal and much of the remainder sabotaged. The urban economy collapsed along with the national network of marketing which had so recently been usurped by the new Portuguese migrants.

Not until independence and the flight of colonial capital did the speculative property market collapse and with it formal sector growth stagnated. Only then did peri-urban informal building at the margins of the city begin in earnest. The old Musseques could accept no more population and the kind of growth at the urban periphery, typical of many Third World cities began to be seen.

Thousands of Angolans who had taken refuge in neighbouring countries made their return. Rather than moving back to their war ravaged villages, many came directly to Luanda with their aspirations of reaping the fruits of independence. A fortunate few were able to occupy houses or flats but more often shells of buildings left by the fleeing Portuguese; these had by and large been shunned by the urban Musseque inhabitants who preferred to remain in their own communities rather than be seen to step into the shoes of their previous creditors.

Most post independence returnees and the rural migrants who were to follow, finding no room to settle in the urbanized zone nor in the old already overcrowded Musseques, were pushed out to the periphery to the new Musseques of Cazenga and Golf or to found new ones like Sapu and Cicolo.

HOUSING POLICY AND THE NEW STATE:

With independence in 1975, the new state was forced by the flight of most technicians and managers into taking over the running of many sectors of the economy for which they were poorly equipped and for which human resources could not always be found. The new government, in its attempt to move as quickly as possible out of the confines of underdevelopment, found itself attracted to the logic of industrialized building as a possible solution to the tremendous needs for housing the rapidly growing urban populations. "Mass Housing" was seen as synonymous with "Housing for the Masses". The dream of an "industrial revolution" following on the heels of Angola's "political revolution", influenced post-independence planners.

The Luanda region was in fact left with the framework of a considerable infrastructure of light and medium scale industry. Within the environs of the city are a cement plant, brick and tile kilns, a plywood factory and medium size industrial units which produced building hardware and fittings. The well developed ceramics industry produced most of the blocks and tiles for modern sector building during the colonial times. With the departure of the factory owners, managers, and machine operators, and even more crucially the sabotage of equipment, many of these units have been reduced to running at a minimal level with improvised, almost artisanal technologies. Others have ceased to function.

While the potential still exists to revitalize the manufacture of local materials such as ceramics, the ministries responsible for construction made the decision early on to opt for the development of new pre-fabricated building technologies. Angola was not alone in Africa in following this approach in the first years of independence. Many countries at a similar stage of development have found, however, that prefabrication, rather than being a short cut to housing the masses, tends to produce housing well out of the reach of the most needy, costing more, sometimes several times more, than housing built by conventional means. Rather than being efficient in resources, industrialized building only begins to be comparable in cost to conventional construction in situations where there already exist high levels of infrastructural support, such as transport, energy, and skilled labour. Such situations are still rare in Africa today.

Several schemes were put forward envisioning the eradication of specific Musseques, and their replacement by modern blocks and flats. While funding for these high cost projects is difficult to find, the decision to send the bulldozers into the Musseques is equally difficult to take.

During this period the Musseques continued to increase in both density and area. Few investments were made in these zones which were considered clandestine or at best transitory.


The early 1980's began to see a broadening of policy on housing with the publication of the first "Auto-Construcao" law. The law aimed at trying to offer some direction to the tremendous energy being channeled into the popular or informal housing sector, and at the same time offer some basic support from the state in the area of planning and the provision of infrastructure. The law attempted to coordinate action of the various ministries from Construction to Energy, and levels of government, both national and local, in support for private house building. The structure provided for a plot application process with priorities for certain sectors of the population; and for pre-designated sites, which were designed to facilitate future servicing. Provisions were made for owner-builders to purchase limited amounts of building materials from state enterprises at non-black-market prices. Most importantly, areas were to be reserved for social services, schools and clinics.

The Auto-Construcao initiative, presupposed sufficient virgin urban land where "site and service" type projects could be laid out. The weak urban planning and management structures inherited from the Portuguese meant that most land tended to be already occupied in an anarchic manner. Open space zoned for industry logically became prime land for occupation by workers of nearby factories. It became difficult to control squatters who moved onto sites as soon as local government made it available through the Auto-Construcao program. While the Auto-Construcao initiative attempted to repond to the needs of the new owner-builder, it could only indirectly offer the existing Musseque dweller the option of improving his housing conditions by moving to one of the new sites, which were often on the urban periphery. In terms of proximity to work he was often better off in his old Musseque. If a Musseque family did move, their old house was always immediately reoccupied by a new family, often relatives recently arrived from the countryside.



THE MUSSEQUE, 10 YEARS AFTER

Today as many as three quarters of Luanda's one and one quarter million people live in Musseque or peri-urban bairros. The urban infrastructure, originally designed to serve Luanda's 250,000 Portuguese colonial population is totally inadequate to meet today's demands. Urban services have been allowed to run down in the decade since the departure of the Portuguese for lack of maintenance while the long process of training new cadre progresses only too slowly. Most of the Musseque's population has no access to piped water or formal waste disposal systems. A series of floods following on several years of near drought have left some Musseques with permanently inundated areas which can not be drained by the inadequate colonial sewage system. Environmentally related diseases are on the rise and every year the war pushes more rural migrants into the city. New migrants having little urban experience of dealing with sanitation in high density situations bring additional problems with them to the city.



The government's preoccupation to date has been to come to terms with problems of maintenance of the remaining colonial infrastructure and repairing the municipal waste treatment plant sabotaged at independence. New projects underway range from one to divert more water from the Bengo River to help meet the new urban demand, to the new bairro upgrading project using local community participation discussed later.

PROJECT EVOLUTION: 'SAMBIZANGA'

The upgrading initiative grew out of an earlier (1983-84) project for Educational Facilities Planning of primary schools in Luanda, with emphasis on the Musseque bairros. The planning project was undertaken by the Development Workshop and its colleagues in the National Urbanism Department for the Ministry of Education. This program involved training teams of local level planning cadre to work in the bairros, collecting and evaluating information on school conditions. The needs for developing community facilities such as schools was found to be considerable.

With independence had come an opening of access to educational and health services to the whole population. Enrolment in the state schools quadrupled in Luanda in a few short years. Investments were given priority in training teachers and producing textbooks. Any available space was pressed into classroom use. Provisional classrooms were used in three successive shifts per day. Overuse of often ~~unsuitable~~ facilities meant that physical conditions deteriorated rapidly. An inventory of existing facilities and an evaluation of use was essential before any plans for improving or building of new schools in the Musseques could be made.

In the course of working with the intermediate level educational planners it became evident that the small group from Sambizanga were particularly active. The project also soon proved that in Sambizanga the situation was amongst the most critical in the city with student/teacher ratios approaching 60 to 1. One "school" was found in an unshaded yard with more than 250 students, three teachers, and only milk tins for furniture.

It was decided that Sambizanga would be a prime site for intervention to improve conditions, at least for the child population of the bairro. About this time the Angolan Women's Organization (OMA) joined with the National Institute of Public Health (INSP) in setting up a "Commission on Children" to help coordinate action and lobby politicians and government ministries into taking action on improving the environmental conditions for children with special emphasis on the Musseques. OMA in its own programs chose to focus on mother and child health in the urban context. Mass vaccination and bairro clean-up campaigns were organized. The Women's Organization has proven to be extremely effective in these immediate actions, but popular mobilization alone has proven to be insufficient to arrest the deterioration of the urban environment.

After careful study of the Municipality of Sambizanga an ~~area~~ on the margin of the Musseque where space still permitted new migrant families to settle was identified as a pilot zone. While the pilot area contained a pocket of an older dense Musseque some open spaces still did exist.

The area was one of the most lacking in community facilities in Luanda. The relative space and youth of the population were key factors in its choice as a pilot zone. It was felt that there were good prospects for success in this zone, from which lessons could be learned in advance of intervening in some of the older and socially more insular parts of the bairro.

First contacts were made with the community through the Women's Organization and their local delegate in the bairro. Discussions on local needs with the community ranged from water supply, to a school and creche, a health post, and housing improvements. Sensing the planners' bias no doubt, conversations soon focused around educational facilities for the children. A number of families with school age children said that they would be willing to work on weekends to help build a school for the bairro. In turn, members of the planning team undertook to explore possibilities of obtaining materials and equipment. The 'project', by this informal pact, was launched!

Various sites in the bairro were suggested. Planning applications to the City Government were made and each in turn rejected. No plot of land large enough and without a previous claim could be found. Finally a small plot was discovered adjacent to two more plots where local families had just begun to build their own private houses. After long negotiations and a considerable amount of community pressure, the two families agreed to pool their plots with that which was still open to create a site large enough for a school building. The planning group agreed to help the two displaced families find alternative building sites nearby and assist in the legalization of the new sites with the City Government Planning Office. The 'school building initiative' had expanded into 'housing'.

Working within the already in-place Auto-Construcao Laws, it was possible for the owner-builder, upon approval of building rights, for a specified plot of land, to be allocated a quantity of basic materials such as cement and roofing sheets from the production of specified state construction companies. The application procedure was complicated, particularly for often illiterate rural migrants, and not well publicized. One of the requirements for a prospective owner-builder was to submit drawings of the site and the proposed house. Few people had the knowledge or the patience to follow these prescribed procedures, and normally went ahead with housing themselves, finding land and materials through informal channels: cement on the parallel market, although costs up to 30 or 40 times the published government price, and land, though controlled officially by the city government, often changed hands through unregistered deals. Housing costs were consequently extremely high and a major drain on the family income.

While housing was not a part of the planning team's original brief from the Ministry of Education, it became clear that it was not sufficient to narrowly focus on one aspect of the Musseque dwellers' settlement problems. The discussions around the undebatable need for educational facilities became a good entry point for the exogenous planners into the community, whose defensive instincts were already discussed. The building of a new school in the bairro would be an excellent excuse, the community thought, to argue with the city government for the extension of water and electricity lines into the bairro. If a school could be served, then why not the neighbouring bairro as well? But, if the bairro was ever to receive services, plots would have to be legally registered, road and drainage alignments rationalized and the community organized to articulate their needs clearly.

The most obvious grass-roots level organization to work with in the bairros are the 'People's Vigilance Brigades' (BVP's). While originally set up to counter banditry and organize nighttime security in the bairros, these brigades ~~involving~~ all households and organized on a block or "quarterao" basis came to take on a wide variety of functions. Inter-family disputes were settled here. Community leaders tended to emerge through these structures. The BVP's became the logical organizations through which to organize public health and clean-up campaigns. The BVP leadership took on the role of local counterparts with whom the planning team found themselves communicating on a day to day basis.

By early 1985 the local inputs of land and labour had been organized. By this time the small scale local initiative had come to be known as the "Sambizanga Pilot Project". The 'project' still had no funds nor official status, and had only the part-time professional inputs of several architects and planners from the Department of Urbanism and the Development Workshop, who often worked on their weekends when bairro residents could be found home from work.

Within government circles the thinking on urban development had begun to change. It came to be realized that old policies had done little to improve the situation of people living in the Musseques in the decade since independence. The President's Office itself took up the School Facilities Initiative, organizing volunteer brigades from various companies and ministries, who released workers temporarily to assist in school building projects in several bairros of the city. The President's Office, knowing of the work in Sambizanga, offered the materials and workers necessary to move ahead with the construction of the Sambizanga bairro school.

The project area came to be defined by the catchment basin of the planned school. It was felt that the school would serve as a community focus and should accommodate more than just classes, including community meeting spaces. The pilot community encompassing roughly 5000 people in the first phase was made up largely of people who had settled in the area over the last fifteen years. Many were returnees from exile during the liberation war period, others were more recent migrants from rural areas.

With school construction underway in the hands of the Brigade workers, the Sambizanga Project was able to turn its attention to other priorities in upgrading the bairro. The initial group of two families displaced by the school project had grown to six; others in the immediate vicinity volunteered to pool their land for project use in order to take advantage of the planning group's offer to assist with the bureaucratic complexities at the level of the city government for the procurement of tenure rights on new plots, with associated advantages of low cost material allocations. As more members of the community came to realize the advantages of this offer, pressure mounted to join the project.

It had not been the intention of the planning group to assume an advocacy role- representing owner builders on a case by case basis to the City Planning Office. On the other hand, if the upgrading initiative was to move ahead in already crowded bairros the problem of 'overspill' families displaced by community facilities had to be resolved at the outset. It became clear that it was in the interest of a great many of the bairro residents to join the project in order to take advantage of the facilities in the 'Auto-Construcao Law' to formalize their tenure and in doing so receive the right to purchase materials for improving their housing. A model had to be found to resolve both these needs.

After a great deal of detailed study of the physical and socio-economic make up of the community, and in close consultation with residents, the planning team drew up proposals for housing plot layouts on a block by block basis. These layout plans attempted to respect the existing neighbourhood structure as much as possible, but were aimed at rationalizing the use of infill lots to serve as 'overspill' sites for the project. The efficiency of laying in low-cost service lines in the future, when water and electricity became available, was also an important consideration. Long deep lots which minimize street frontage proved to be the most rational. New migrants from the rural areas where land is not at a premium found some of these high density planning considerations curious. Houses in their minds normally presented a broad facade to the street.

Discussions on these and other points were assisted by the use of simple scale models which could be manipulated to demonstrate layout options and possibilities for house growth and future additions.





Illustration of Core House phasing
with extensions up to four rooms.

To facilitate the plot layout and house planning process the planning group drew up a series of housing options, all based on a simple two room 'dry-core' house model. The core allowed an infinite number of extension possibilities, some of which were detailed and modeled. Project members were allowed to use these drawings, if they so chose, to present to the city government for building permission. On the other hand they had the option if they preferred, to buy a set of plans on the parallel market or even design and draw up their own plans to meet building permission requirements.

Houses had to be designed to be upgradable, as did the services. Housing needed to respond to the family's process of accumulation and growth over time. Investments could be made progressively in tune with the family economy.



At the time of writing, water and electricity, though planned, had not yet reached the project area. Although plans have been drawn up and are being implemented for increasing the capacity of the whole city's service structure, it will be many years before there is enough water available to give every family free access. Until then restricted supplies will have to be shared out. Stand-taps to be used communally by between 20 to 40 families are planned for the first phase of the Sambizanga Project. Electric street lighting will be initially installed only at street intersections. Lined drains will take priority over paved roads. Each of these systems will have the built-in capacity to be upgraded when project funds are available and the urban system's capacity has grown to the extent that it can support individual house connections. Even sewage disposal is designed with the upgrading model in mind, beginning with dry pit latrines, although the extremely high costs of water born sewage systems make it doubtful whether such a system is feasible in the foreseeable future.

In every case, when families have to be displaced due to the installation of services, or the opening of space for the implantation of community facilities, overspill lots will have to be found and assistance given in moving and reconstruction. Re-settlement of families in this manner can not be handled on a case-by-case basis by the limited project staff, but a system had to be developed to facilitate the process. Needs in the early stages of reconstruction are common to most families; firstly procurement of a plot, and the securing of planning permission from the city government; secondly the purchase of enough basic materials to build at least an initial core house which can provide immediate basic shelter for the family. Following this the family can follow its own course in extending and adapting the house to meet its needs as to its own resources. These common basic needs may best be met through collective action.

While Angola has had no past experience of housing co-operatives it was decided to study various possible models, specifically looking to neighbouring countries where conditions may be similar. A legally corporate structure such as a cooperative, offers certain advantages to the families wishing to re-build or upgrade their houses. First of all building permission can be granted to whole neighbourhood blocks at the same time, rather than on an individual basis. Application forms are standardized and submitted together with a single block plan showing only first phase core houses drawn up by the project's architects. Procurement of materials could be greatly facilitated by collective purchases. Materials orders may be approved by a single authorization stamp from the City Government. Bulk purchases and transport from the factory to the site effect great savings in time and money.

Because Angola does not yet have a Cooperative Housing Law on the statute books there were no legal guidelines for registering a cooperative or association of Sambizanga residents. An agreement with the "Banco Popular" to allow the residents in the project area to collectively open a bank account under the name of the "Sambizanga Residents Cooperative" gave the entity a provisional legal basis. Two signatories were elected to manage the accounts and make materials purchases on behalf of the cooperative.

The "Cooperative" as it was initiated can only be considered a 'pre-cooperative' as it functioned mainly for the collective procurement of housing inputs such as materials and labour, and as yet had no facility for collective ownership. While the cooperative was established to support the process of "Auto-Construcao" or self-help owner-controlled building, it was hoped that the institution of the cooperative would encourage mutual-assistance and lead to the evolution of higher forms of co-operation in the future.

The cooperative's capacity to make materials purchases was still limited; a member was only eligible to obtain materials sufficient to build his or her basic core house. Because of the limited amount of materials available through official channels, these had to be shared out equally, if the cooperative system was to prove to be a model replicable on a larger urban scale. Uncontrolled access to materials may tempt a member to sell a portion of the materials obtained through the cooperative, on the parallel market where they could attain high prices. A control was maintained on distribution by issuing to each member a "Building Materials Account Card" which listed financial contributions made to the cooperative fund, against which materials or other equipment could be drawn. Materials were to be released in batches keyed to the phasing of the construction program; ie. enough cement to make a foundation for the initial two room core house was the first batch; the second was materials to build a latrine; the third, cement to make soil-cement blocks for the walls etc...

It was envisioned that the Cooperative would eventually be opened to all members of the community and help, not only in the building of new 'overspill' housing, but also assist people in household improvements, extensions, the building of latrines and ongoing repairs. Through the cooperative, work brigades can be organized to assist for example, in the digging of drainage channels and waterlines. It is hoped that the cooperative's function will not cease with house construction but provide an ongoing structure into which the Project can eventually be devolved.

THE EXPERIENCE, EARLY RESULTS:

At the time of writing, the cooperative has a mere twenty families as members, though the waiting list is long. Six families are in the process of building their houses on infill sites in the first block or 'quarterao', and the others are still assembling materials and making building blocks in anticipation of beginning construction. A second 'quarterao' which contains forty housing lots is being presently marked out.

Progress has been slow and irregular. Bureaucratic structures inherited from the colonial era have worked against this kind of initiative. Few external models are applicable in the Angolan reality of continuing war fueled migration, the broken infrastructure and the multi-sectoral informal economy which makes economic planning extremely difficult.

While the Project was initiated by the actions of a small group of planners, convinced that improvements in the Musseques could only be effected with the participation of the bairro's people themselves, the material inputs have to date been all local ones. Housing upgrading has been funded solely by the cooperative members themselves. The local initiative of the Sambizanga people has been recognized and on the basis of this still tentative experience mechanisms are evolving which will allow for the allocation of state resources for the 'popular housing sector'. The Banco Popular which gave the cooperative its early official status by granting it an account, is taking particular interest. The possibility of offering housing credits through cooperative mortgage schemes is being explored.

The current formalization of an Office for Musseques Upgrading with technical assistance from the Development Workshop under a new multi-sectoral Ministry of State for Production, will give the urban development initiative the political support it needs. On the basis of the Sambizanga experience a new model of development, growing out of the reality of Luanda's Musseques population, may evolve.

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Development Workshop was established in 1973 as an organization concerned with problems of Human Settlements in Developing Countries. DW is presently working with international organizations, NGO's and governments in a number of African and Asian Countries.

Development Workshop has been in Angola since 1980, having been initially invited on the basis of a series of workshops that they ran during the Habitat Forum in Vancouver in 1976. DW has worked on a wide variety of projects in Angola in collaboration with: the National Department of Urbanism, the Angolan Women's Organization, the Ministry of Education, and more recently with GARM for whom Development Workshop provides technical assistance. DW is working presently with a number of international donor agencies who are exploring means of assistance to the Luanda bairro upgrading initiative.

GABINETE DE RENOVACAO E REABILITACAO DOS MUSSEQUES (GARM)

GARM is an office for urban renewal, which is presently being set up to coordinate urban projects. GARM grew out of the Sambizanga Project, and presently Sambizanga remains GARM's chief preoccupation. DW has a formal technical assistance agreement with GARM.

Contacts: Fernando Tavares Alves- Urbanist
Antonio Monteiro- Architect

ANGOLAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION (OMA)

OMA has supported the Sambizanga upgrading project from its inception. The Women's Organization has volunteer member groups in all of the Bairros of Luanda, and throughout the country. They run their own programs and campaigns with a particular emphasis on women and children.

Development Workshop is involved with OMA in a related program (not discussed in this paper) focused on basic low cost Urban Sanitation for the Musseque bairros. This deals with improved latrines, solid waste disposal and surface water drainage.

Contact: Ruthe Neto- National General Secretary



Meeting of Members of the Sambizanga Residents Cooperative.

